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LITIGATION FUNDING AND THE PROBLEM OF
AGENCY COST IN REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS
Samuel Issacharoff*
Alternative sources of litigation funding are complicating the already
difficult world of complex litigation.  While still in its infancy in the
United States, the role of equity financing of contingent litigation is
now well rooted in Australia, and establishing itself in Canada and
the United Kingdom as well.  This Article examines the market gaps
filled by litigation funders in Australia and then the potential role to
be played in the United States.  In particular, the Article looks to
litigation funding as a way to potentially protect absent class mem-
bers in class actions and other representative proceedings.
WHY LITIGATION FUNDING?
The funding of legal services is a subject not generally fit for polite
company.  We know from the Supreme Court that “a lawyer is under
an ethical obligation to exercise independent professional judgment
on behalf of his client; he must not allow his own interests, financial or
otherwise, to influence his professional advice.”1  We have even been
told that coerced fee waivers in statutory fee-shifting cases are un-
likely to affect the willingness of lawyers to take on such cases—per
the Court, there is little evidence that fee waivers will affect the will-
ingness to take cases for impoverished clients, given that “as a practi-
cal matter the likelihood of this circumstance arising is remote.”2
We further know from centuries of inherited English tradition that
litigation is an evil to be avoided.3  The multiple offenses of barratry,
maintenance, and champerty were all ways to root out the peril of
“officious intermeddling in a suit that no way belongs to one, by main-
* Reiss Professor of Constitutional Law, New York University School of Law.  I am deeply
indebted to Justice Bernard Murphy of the Federal Court of Australia for first tutoring me on
the dynamics of litigation funding.  I subsequently profited from insights provided by Sean Cof-
fey, Ashley Keller, Travis Lenkner, Michael Klausner, and Francis McGovern.  No views or
claims in this Article should be attributed to any of these fine individuals.  Thad Eagles and
Dohee Min provided excellent research assistance.
1. Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 728 n.14 (1986).
2. Id. at 741 n.34.
3. See WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA
UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT 2 (1991) (“America’s common law tradition, like the legal tradition of
every great nation, formerly viewed a lawsuit as an evil, at best a necessary evil.”).
561
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taining or assisting either party with money or otherwise to prosecute
or defend it.”4  When I was first exposed to legal ethics in law school,
even the contingency fee was only grudgingly accepted as perhaps a
necessity for some misfits, but not really suitable for gentlemen:
Although a lawyer generally should decline to accept employment
on a contingent fee basis by one who is able to pay a reasonable
fixed fee, it is not necessarily improper for a lawyer, where justified
by the particular circumstances of a case, to enter into a contingent
fee contract in a civil case with any client who, after being fully in-
formed of all relevant factors, desires that arrangement.5
So with some shock and the same sense of nostalgic regret that at-
taches to the loss of the horse and buggy, black-and-white television,
and dial-up internet connections, I turn to the brave new world of
financially structured intermeddling.  For those who watch Downton
Abbey with fleeting hope that respectable British mores will protect
us from the vulgarity of modern life, the news from abroad is frighten-
ing.  In short order, the former colonies have undone the honored
Blackstonian traditions.  First Australia, then Canada, and now even
England—yes, Mother England6—all have let the venture capitalists,
the investment banks, and the hedge funds into the litigation process.7
Alone, the United States seems to have claimed a righteous path to
maintain barriers, even criminal barriers, against the commercial fi-
nancing of people having a good legal row.8
Now it seems we too are succumbing to the view that litigation is a
commercial venture and that legal disputes may properly be com-
modified.9  It is of course only a short step from such insults to the
noble traditions of the elite bar to complete debasement in something
like lawyer advertising.  Alas, that too is upon us—and constitution-
ally protected to boot.
To be more serious about the emerging market for interests in liti-
gation requires trying to figure out what the market for financing pro-
vides and why there might be a demand for it.  This Article will try to
do so primarily by examining one of the wellsprings for the bur-
4. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *134–35.
5. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-20 (1980).
6. CHRISTOPHER HODGES ET AL., LITIGATION FUNDING: STATUS AND ISSUES 38 (2012), avail-
able at http://www.csls.ox.ac.uk/documents/ReportonLitigationFunding.pdf.
7. Id. at 6.
8. Id. at 46–47.
9. Rachel M. Zahorsky, Third-Party Litigation Funding Picks Up as UK Investors Eye US
Cases, A.B.A. J. (June 4, 2010), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/third-party_litigation_
funding_picks_up_as_uk_investors_eye_u.s._case/; see also Kevin M. LaCroix, Has the “Litiga-
tion Funding Moment” Arrived?, D&O DIARY (Feb. 4, 2013), http://www.dandodiary.com/2013/
02/articles/securities-litigation/has-the-litigation-funding-moment-arrived/.
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geoning of litigation finance: the role of funders assuming some of the
risks and benefits of representative litigation.10  The best comparison
is between Australia, where litigation funding took off as a way of
financing class actions,11 and the United States, where the relation of
funding to class claims remains uncertain.12  While that is the basic
structure of this Article, it is first necessary to examine a few reasons
why litigation funding is attractive in any setting.
It has always been the case that parties are free to borrow money to
finance specific pieces of litigation, as indeed are lawyers in those ju-
risdictions that permit contingency fees.13  What litigation funding
represents is an attempt to raise money by way of equity rather than
debt.14  If we view the prosecution or defense of a lawsuit as an eco-
nomic decision to pursue an aim in either obtaining or avoiding liabil-
ity, then the question becomes how to finance the venture.  On this
view, the decision to litigate or settle (including by foregoing suit or
confessing judgment) is an economic calculus based on the likely re-
turns to the investment of time and resources in a legal dispute.15  Ba-
sic finance theory indicates that firms should balance between
underwriting their venture through debt or equity depending on a va-
riety of factors including risk, cash flow, and opportunity costs of
other ventures.16  The prohibitions encompassed in the barratry-
champerty-maintenance troika basically restrict the ability to raise
money for legal ventures through equity financing.17  In turn, that
means that litigants, and in particular lawyers undertaking the risk of
contingency cases, must turn to debt as a way to manage the costs of
litigation.  As the stakes of the case grow, servicing debt is a major
concern for the operation of a contingent market, especially in mass
litigation and class actions.
10. HODGES ET AL., supra note 6, at 2.
11. Id. at 38.
12. See Deborah R. Hensler, The Future of Mass Litigation: Global Class Actions and Third-
Party Litigation Funding, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 306, 322 (2011).
13. HODGES ET AL., supra note 6, at 43–46.
14. William Alden, Looking to Make a Profit on Lawsuits, Firms Invest in Them, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 30, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/30/looking-to-make-a-profit-on-lawsuits-
firms-invest-in-them/; see also Mary Campbell, Q&A: We’ll See You In Court, FINALTERNA-
TIVES (May 23, 2013), http://www.finalternatives.com/node/23746 (interview with Jeremy Wal-
ton, Partner, Appleby Global).
15. This is the basic economic model of litigation formalized in RICHARD A. POSNER, ECO-
NOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (8th ed. 2011).  For an extended discussion of the early models and the
impact of strategic behavior and behavioral economics, see my chapter entitled Why Litigate? in
SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, CIVIL PROCEDURE  198–222 (3d ed. 2011).
16. See Stewart C. Meyers, Capital Structure, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 2001, at 81.
17. HODGES ET AL., supra note 6, at 2.
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The problem of reliance on debt financing is then compounded by a
further ethical prohibition on allowing anyone other than lawyers to
hold a security interest in the proceeds of the practice of law.18  Again,
England long ago did away with such prohibitions, and integrated
firms of attorneys and accountants have proved both financially viable
and suitable for giving comprehensive financial advice to clients.19  In
the context of funding litigation, this prohibition means that lawyers
have to securitize debt based upon the personal assets of the partners
in the firm or firms undertaking the representation.20  In turn, the cost
of finance is high because, unlike normal business ventures, loans can-
not be securitized against individual cases within the firm’s book of
business.  Worse yet, punitive IRS regulations do not allow lawyers to
expense the costs of litigation on an accrual basis.  The expenses on
any given case must be carried forward until they can be deducted
against the gains of success and are simply swallowed whole by the
firm if it happens to lose the case.21
As a result, lawyers operating on contingency are frequently look-
ing for monetary reserves to help fund litigation without assuming on-
erous cash-flow burdens from debt and the adverse tax implications of
not being able to smooth out profits and losses as they accrue.  In such
circumstances, lawyers have to seek out a form of equity financing by
offering a stake in litigation to those better suited to absorb the cash-
flow demands.  Because of the prohibition on nonlawyers acquiring a
stake in the returns of legal practice, the best (and oftentimes only)
source of such financing is other lawyers.  Consequently, as basic eco-
nomics teaches, when the supply to a market demand is artificially
constricted in this way, prices will be high.22  Allowing lawyers to raise
money for case prosecution through equity rather than debt should
serve to rationalize the economics of legal practice, promote competi-
18. See Ryan S. Christensen, Note, Roosters in the Henhouse? How Attorney-Accountant Part-
nerships Would Benefit Consumers and Corporate Clients, 37 J. CORP. L. 911, 913–14 (2012)
(discussing Model Rule 5.4).
19. Id. at 916–17.
20. HODGES ET AL., supra note 6, at 46.
21. JOHN P. QUINN ET AL., LAW FIRM ACCOUNTING AND FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT § 17.04,
at 17-15 (3d ed. 2001) (“Regardless of the method of accounting, if an expenditure is determined
to have significant long-term benefit, it may be a nondeductible capital expenditure rather than
an ordinary and necessary business expense.”).  Litigation costs are treated as loans to clients
and thus not deductible as current business costs. Attorneys Audit Technique Guide—Chapter 3,
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-Employed/
Attorneys-Audit-Technique-Guide—-Chapter-3#ch3-corporate (last updated June 26, 2013).
22. Supply and Demand, BASIC ECON., http://www.basiceconomics.info/supply-and-demand.
php (last visited Nov. 27, 2013).
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tion, and perhaps even bring down the costs of some forms of legal
representation.
It would be a mistake, however, to assume that demand for litiga-
tion funding in the United States is driven primarily by the plaintiffs’
bar.  Rather, the primary initial demand appears to come from institu-
tional actors unfamiliar with the role of being claimants in the legal
system, unsure of how to assess legal risk.  Consider a multinational
firm with an asset such as a contract claim or a patent that might be
enforceable in the United States.  As a general matter, the firm is
likely to be alarmed that its litigation costs in the United States are
already higher than in any corresponding market—for reasons that I
previously addressed when last invited to the Clifford Symposium.23
Such a firm will have neither the experience nor the confidence to
assess the wisdom of investing in litigation in the United States.  And
yet the claim might have positive expected value.
In some circumstances, the market figured out a way to securitize
legal claims indirectly when the claim comes to define the underlying
enterprise.  For example, a small innovation shop may have little
ongoing business but a strong intellectual property claim to a valuable
product.  When the legal claim is the most valuable asset of the enter-
prise, there is no prohibition in the selling off of shares in the firm,
even if the practical effect is to securitize a litigation option.  We of
course refer to such entrepreneurs of legal entitlement as patent trolls:
legal versions of mythical cave dwellers, who can mimick human soci-
ety while posing mortal threats to the honest ability of Mickey Mouse
to snatch another 75-year monopoly from millions of would-be
Mouseketeers.24
Unfortunately, our large hypothetical foreign enterprise cannot sell
off pieces of itself for this purpose and it is unlikely to create a new
subsidiary solely for this undertaking.  Were the firm to cede a per-
centage of the possible proceeds to someone with the expertise to as-
sess the litigation value of the claim and to monitor the work of
prosecuting the claim, the legal claim would become something of re-
alizable value.  This is precisely the role that litigation funders are
23. See generally Samuel Issacharoff, Regulating After the Fact, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 375
(2007).
24. See generally Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (rejecting a challenge to the Copy-
right Term Extension Act, which extended copyright protection from the creation of the pro-
tected work until seventy years after the author’s death). President Obama recently joined in the
seemingly universal condemnation of patent trolls. See Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y,
Fact Sheet: White House Task Force on High-Tech Patent Issues (June 4, 2013), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/04/fact-sheet-white-house-task-force-high-
tech-patent-issues.
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playing already.  They assume the risk and costs of a litigation ven-
ture25 for a structured return that looks very much in sum and sub-
stance like a contingency fee.26
From the vantage point of the foreign enterprise, the use of a
funder to absorb the risks of litigation, monitor the performance of
the lawyer-agents, and take on the cash-flow obligations—in whole or
in part—is a simple application of the Coasean theory of the firm.27
There is no particular reason to believe that a foreign enterprise is
best suited to assess offensive litigation in terms of costs or likely re-
turn.  Moreover, the enterprise most likely has a highly developed
sense of its internal rate of return on the deployment of its capital—
something that is difficult to reproduce in the role of claimant in a
foreign legal system.
Normatively, access to any form of litigation funding, even in the
form of a contingency fee, turns on the underlying social value of liti-
gation.  As the President of the UK Supreme Court recently allowed,
“How litigation funding will develop in the years to come is something
that we will all watch keenly, because funding is the life-blood of the
justice system. . . .  [I]t helps maintain our society as an inclusive
one . . . .  [A]ccess to justice is of the essence in a civilized society.”28
Even accepting the normative preconditions, a further question in
the American context is whether such arrangements can be harnessed
to address the serious agency costs associated with representative liti-
gation.  Unlike the patent holder or the large foreign multinational,
litigation funding in the class action context occurs where there is no
real principal standing behind the claims.  In the classic negative value
cases, the entrepreneurial drive and the capitalization behind the case
are generated by class counsel.  But the combination of passive princi-
pals and active lawyer-agents yields a robust line of cases, most nota-
bly Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor29 and Ortiz v. Fibreboard
Corp.,30 which express strong concerns about the possible mismatch of
incentives between lawyers and the mass of passive and nonparticipat-
ing class members.  For the individual claimant, such as the patent
holder or the foreign enterprise, the normal rules about liberty of fi-
25. HODGES ET AL., supra note 6, at 2.
26. See id. at 9.
27. Cf. R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
28. Lord David Neuberger, President, Supreme Court of the U.K., From Barretry, Mainte-
nance and Champerty to Litigation Funding: Lecture at the Harbour Litigation Funding First
Annual Lecture 22–23 (May 8, 2013)  (manuscript available at http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/
docs/speech-130508.pdf).
29. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 626 (1997).
30. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 856 (1999).
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nance markets hold and the question is why litigation should not be
treated as a corresponding cost of business.  For the passive repre-
sented parties, however, the question is not simply one of an autono-
mous liberty to contract, but one of how noncontractual agency
relations are structured.
To examine this question, I compare the context in which litigation
funding emerged in Australian class actions to the role that litigation
funding could play in the United States.  I leave aside the discussion of
how far the prohibitions on various forms of third-party financing
have broken down in the United States—that work has been ably un-
dertaken by others, most notably Jonathan Molot31 and Anthony
Sebok.32  Rather, I  assume for purposes of this Article that the barri-
ers will continue to fall and that the remaining questions concern the
role that litigation funding is likely to play in the United States.
II. THE VIEW FROM DOWN UNDER
Markets reward entrepreneurial initiative.  Starting from this basic
intuition, new economic enterprises must find a market niche to fill.
In classic “follow the money” fashion, the questions are why Australia
was such an attractive site for experimentation with funding, and why
class actions in particular were such an early focus of private funders.
At its simplest, the success of private funders in Australia was the re-
sult of the ability of litigation finance systems to overcome two of the
critical obstacles to class actions in that country: the “loser pays” sys-
tem33 and the prohibition on contingency fees.34  The use of private
funders corresponds to these two debilitating factors in the develop-
ment of mass-style litigation in Australia.
31. See Jonathan T. Molot, Litigation Finance: A Market Solution to a Procedural Problem, 99
GEO. L.J. 65 (2010).
32. See Anthony J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, 64 VAND. L. REV. 61 (2011).  For an ac-
count of the problems in the traditional attorney-client setting caused by third-party litigation
funding, see Grace M. Giesel, Alternative Litigation Finance and the Work-Product Doctrine, 47
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1083 (2012).
33. George R. Barker, Third-Party Litigation Funding in Australia and Europe, 8 J.L. ECON.
& POL’Y 451, 468 (2012) (“Australia and the U.K. use the so-called loser pays, or English rule,
for the allocation of court costs.”); see also Anthony Lin, Australia’s Litigation-Funding Giant
Looks Abroad, LAW.COM (July 6, 2011), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202499382901&
Australias_LiLitigationFundi_Giant_Looks_Abroad.
34. Paul Von Nessen, Australian Shareholders Rejoice: Current Developments in Australian
Corporate Litigation, 31 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 647, 668 (2008) (“Australian law, like
that of the United Kingdom, does not normally allow for contingency fees for lawyers.”); see also
Robert C. Weber, IBM GC Says: Beware of Lenders Offering to Finance Your Lawsuit, FORBES
(Feb. 12, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2013/02/12/ibm-gc-says-beware-of-lend-
ers-offering-to-finance-your-lawsuit/.
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First, the loser pays regime makes any mass action (defined by the
overriding commonality of the claims among the potential plaintiffs)
difficult to get off the ground.  By definition, a class action corre-
sponds to a broad-based harm with a significant number of people
affected in similar fashion.  Under the standards of all legal systems
that allow for some form of non-state directed collective litigation, the
requirements of many parties and commonality of claims will be the
predicate for aggregate proceedings.35  But the premise of the class
action immediately runs into tension with the idea of losing party lia-
bility for costs and fees expended by the prevailing party.  The more
common the injuries and the more diffuse the injured parties (as with
a nationwide or international economic fraud), the more unlikely it is
that any claimant would come forward to assume the risks associated
with not prevailing—and to assume them on behalf of the entire class
or mass group—with no possibility for recovery if the case goes sour.
If we assume the facts of a small-value consumer claim, for example,
the risk associated with the costs of a successful defense far outweigh
any possible gain to the named, representative claimant.  Judge Rich-
ard Posner once wrote in explanation of the economic premises of a
class action that, “only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.”36  It would
take a particularly fanatical lunatic to do so and assume the risk of
millions of dollars in an adverse costs judgment to boot.
Recent developments in Australian class action litigation have
pushed even further toward nearly requiring litigation funding as a
condition of bringing a class action.  In a recent decision of the Fed-
eral Court, the court with national jurisdiction over securities class ac-
tions, the court required a group of allegedly defrauded investors to
post security for the entire potential cost liability should the plaintiff
class lose, even though the named litigants constituted only a fraction
of the claims in dispute.37  The trial judge held that requiring this pay-
ment would stifle the litigation, as many plaintiffs would be unlikely to
participate in the class action either because they would be financially
unable to contribute or because their contribution would be dispro-
portionate to the amount they stood to gain.38  Requiring a security
payment would, in the view of the trial court, violate the “traditional
rule . . . that natural persons . . . will not, by reason of impecuniousity
35. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a); Representative Proceedings, FED. CT. OF AUSTL., http://
www.fedcourt.gov.au/case-management-services/class-actions (last visited June 21, 2013).
36. Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004).
37. Madgwick v Kelly [2013] FCAFC 61 ¶ 86.
38. Kelly v Willmott Forests Ltd [2012] FCA 1446 ¶¶ 119–22.  The court noted that this was
especially likely because the more people who opted out of the class action, the higher the bur-
den on the remaining plaintiffs, increasing the likelihood that more opt out, and so on. Id. ¶ 121.
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alone, be barred from continuing with proceedings by the granting of
an order for security for costs.”39  The full Federal Court, however,
overturned this decision, and held that a class of investors that poten-
tially had a “real capacity to pay”  could not claim the protection of
rules designed to protect those who were truly impoverished.40
Second, the restriction on contingency fees means that the claim-
ants’ counsel has a difficult time justifying the risk-reward ratio of
mass litigation.  In most American class actions, all expenses are
borne by class counsel, who in turn expect to recover their capital out-
lays and the imputed value of their time through a percentage of the
recovery—what is termed a common-fund award.41  Under Australian
law, contingency fees are not allowed as such.42  A lawyer for a pre-
vailing client may get an “uplift” to reflect the risk of nonrecovery
from her own client in case of a loss.  But that uplift is charged to the
opposing party and a 25% uplift is the maximum allowed in no-win,
no-fee conditional representation.43  A large case may justify fees for
a great deal of work, but those fees can never exceed 125% of the
imputed hourly billing (what in the United States would be termed a
lodestar).  Australian lawyers are unwilling to assume responsibility
for costs both because the upside potential of a modest uplift does not
justify out-of-pocket expenses and because of a fear that assuming the
cost responsibility for a case will invite fee-shifting against the firm
(rather than the client) should the case fail.44  Accordingly, a case that
requires out-of-pocket expenses (exclusive of attorney time) of mil-
lions of dollars would allow only the recovery of those expenditures as
part of costs, but would not allow any leverage off of that investment.
As a result, such claims are limited to those which are near certain to
prevail, even apart from the difficulty created by the loser pays rule.
Enter the funders.  Litigation funders can cure both of these defects
at one time.  First, and most readily, the funders can immunize the
named class representatives against an adverse judgment and its cost
39. Id. ¶ 20.
40. Madgwick, [2013] FCAFC 61 ¶ 86.
41. Charles Silver, A Restitutionary Theory of Attorneys’ Fees in Class Actions, 76 CORNELL L.
REV. 656 (1991); cf. Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method of
Managing Multi-District Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107, 109 (2010).
42. Von Nessen, supra note 34, at 668; see also Weber, supra note 34.
43. CHRISTINE PARKER & ADRIAN EVANS, INSIDE LAWYERS’ ETHICS 192 (2007); see also Stu-
art Clark & Christina Harris, The Push to Reform Class Action Procedure in Australia: Evolution
or Revolution?, 32 MELB. U. L. REV. 775, 789–90 (2008), available at http://www.mulr.com.au/
issues/32_3/32_3_1.pdf.
44. See Monique Lapointe, Note, Attorney’s Fees in Common Fund Actions, 59 FORDHAM L.
REV. 843, 845–46, 846 n.23 (1991).
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consequences—in effect, a form of litigation insurance.45  Second, and
most significantly, the funders operate under a completely different
risk calculus than do the claimants’ counsel.  Funders have direct con-
tractual relations with the claimants and advance costs and fee immu-
nization as part of a contractual exchange.  The quid that follows from
this quo is that funders contractually agree to a recovery of a percent-
age of the litigation proceeds—in effect a contingency fee.  But be-
cause the relationship is not one of attorney-client, there is no
professional attorney prohibition on such a securitized loan.  The only
barrier would have been our delightful barratry-champerty-mainte-
nance troika, but those have now been jettisoned under Australian
law.46  The going rate in these funding contracts, seemingly across the
board, is 40%, curiously identical to the percentage to which Ameri-
can contingency fees have gravitated.47  The one difference is that in
the United States, court supervision of class actions has brought down
that percentage in large cases.48  In Australia, by contrast, this is
treated as purely a matter of private contract.49
Funders, however, faced an obstacle not present in the American
class action context, or even under Australian class action rules.  The
45. There appears to be some uncertainty in Australia about whether firms do offer to under-
write costs to induce class representatives to come forward.  It appears to be possible under
Australian law for law firms to do so, although plaintiffs’ counsel I spoke to said they could not
undertake such risk.  On the other hand, in private discussions with Australian judges, I repeat-
edly heard the view that this was already happening, or at least that the judges thought that it
must be happening.  I did not hear any confirmation from the leading claimants’ firms that they
engaged in this practice, although they would have an appreciable interest in not advertising
their willingness to assume such risks.
46. MICHAEL LEGG, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, LITIGATION FUNDING IN
AUSTRALIA: IDENTIFYING AND ADDRESSING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST FOR LAWYERS 3 (2012),
available at http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/sites/default/files/Litigation_Funding_in_
Australia.pdf; see also Ian C. Pilarczyk, What is Barratry? A Far from Frivolous Question!, SUN-
DRY TOPICS ON THE MAJESTY AND MYSTERY OF LAW (Sept. 11, 2012) (“[Barratry] has likewise
falled into desuetude in a number of other common law jurisdictions, such as Australia.”), http://
iancpilarczyk.com/2012/09/what-is-barratry-a-far-from-frivolous-question/.
47. The latest development seems to be an effort by law firms in Australia to create a related
funding entity in order to perform the role of counsel and funder.  John Emmerig & Michael
Legg, Do-It-Yourself Funding for Class Actions in Australia Takes an Interesting Twist, JONES
DAY (June 2013), http://www.jonesday.com/do-it-yourself-funding-for-class-actions-in-australia-
takes-an-interesting-twist/.
48. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees in Class Action Settlements:
An Empirical Study, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 27, 30 (2004) ; see also Brian T. Fitzpatrick,
An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee Awards, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 811, 837–39 (demonstrating that “fee percentage is strongly and inversely associated with
settlement size”).  Fitzpatrick’s research shows that when settlements reached $100 million, fee
percentages “plunged” below 20%, and at $500 million, most were under even 10%. Id. at
839–40.
49. Jasminka Kalajdzic et al., Justice for Profit: A Comparative Analysis of Australian, Cana-
dian and U.S. Third Party Litigation Funding, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 93, 109 (2013).
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certification of a class action in the United States requires the assign-
ment of a monopoly on representation to class counsel.  Some may
opt out, but for the members of the certified class there is a court-
enforced exclusivity of representation.  When a certified class recovers
a judgment, it is only class counsel that may seek a fee for the repre-
sentation.50  The investment in the litigation brings a reward to the
class as the principal, and the lawyers seek compensation as the duti-
ful agent of the class.  Under the common-fund theory born of restitu-
tionary principles, no class member may be heard to complain that no
fee is owed for the services to which she was a passive beneficiary.51
The principle is that no class member gets something for nothing.
In order for the Australian litigation finance system to work, the
funders must realize the economies of scale of full litigation returns on
their expenditures.  This means that they must be able to resist free
riding on their investment.  One manifestation of this is the funders’
concern that in any class action, the returns to the class may be real-
ized by their backer.  In the United States this is done through the
plaintiffs’ counsel advancing costs and then seeking a common-fund
recovery—the effect of which is that the court in awarding fees
thwarts free riding by forcing the class as a whole to compensate coun-
sel.52  This cannot be done in Australia because funding is a matter of
private contract between the funders and claimants on an individual
basis. Since the court does not provide an enforceable monopoly on
representation, exclusivity in the provision of benefits is a real
problem.
Fortunately for the funders, Australian class action law provided the
solution.  Australian courts now allow for a class to be defined not in
terms of the underlying transaction but in terms of the commonality of
the class in how they want to prosecute the claims.53  In a securities
50. I leave to the side the various ways in which other attorneys might seek compensation for
benefits independently conferred upon the class, a minor issue.  I also leave to the side the
emergence of a bar of strategic objectors who threaten to derail the completion of the litigation
unless they are paid off, a major issue.
51. Silver, supra note 41, at 664.
52. Lapointe, supra note 44, at 844–45.
53. Australian class certification is presumed from the pleadings and does not have hurdles
such as the American requirement that common issues predominate over individual issues. STU-
ART CLARK & COLIN LOVEDAY, CLAYTON UTZ, CLASS ACTIONS IN AUSTRALIA: AN OVERVIEW
2 (2004), available at http://www.claytonutz.com/docs/Class%20Actions_Aug04.pdf.  For funders,
this has allowed a class to be defined as a “closed class” of all persons with a common legal claim
who have contracted with the same funder—with the object being to prevent free riders. See
Ken Fowlie & Ben Phi, Shareholder Class Actions in Australia: Current State of Play, SLATER &
GORDON LAWS. 2–3, http://www.slatergordon.com.au/files/editor_upload/File/flyers/Shareholder
%20Class%20Actions.pdf (last visited June 18, 2013); see also Deborah R. Hensler, Notes on
(Some of) the Effects of Alternative Litigation Financing on Large-Scale Litigation 2 (Apr.
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fraud claim, for example, a class may be certified as comprised of all
persons who bought Widget securities between January 1, 2006, and
December 31, 2006, and who are contractual clients of ABC Funders.
Courts have recognized such a class definition as proper and have de-
fined class counsel as representing that group, thereby bringing the
funding relationship into the formal structure of class litigation.  Once
so constituted, the class is in effect the creature of the underlying fi-
nancing contract, and the funders assume the role of the employers of
class counsel, who in effect relinquish control of the case in exchange
for no longer facing the risk of getting no compensation.
Unsurprisingly, as funded class actions mature, a secondary market
has developed in what are termed “outside” or “open” class actions: a
second class of those with no contractual relation to the funders (now
termed the “inside” or “closed” class) who in turn hope to piggy-back
on the litigation efforts of the primary class.54  This duplication of liti-
gation results in judicial resources being wasted either in the litigation
of separate proceedings, or in trying to manage the separate proceed-
ings efficiently through stays or consolidations, and in defendants be-
ing less likely to settle because settlement will not resolve all potential
claims arising out of the cause of action.55
Because the outside class cannot overcome the disincentives to
prosecution of the claims, the strategy has to depend on the existence
of a class that is properly incentivized through the independent
funders.  The lack of a unified class, however, restores the possibility
of free riding by members of the “open class” who may benefit from
2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.law.gwu.edu/News/20112012events/
Documents/ALF%20Event%20Submissions/Hensler%20ALF%20Submission.pdf (“The class in
a third-party funded class action is defined as all class members who have suffered injuries or
loss arising out of the same facts and law and have retained the lawyer who is receiving third-party
funding.”).
54. The emergence of “closed” and “open” classes complicates the class action picture and
introduces strategic complexity into trying to negotiate settlements.  Already there are efforts to
resolve the inefficiency by charging a common fund recovery to the members of the open class,
in order to compensate properly the parties who assumed the risks of the litigation.  Hensler,
supra note 53, at 1–2.  This approach will especially help consumer class actions because litiga-
tion funders are unwilling to fund unless they can get most members and members cannot bring
their claims without funding, but it would also begin to collapse the distinction between the
Australian system and the common fund doctrine in the United States.  For recent examples of
such complicated class arrangements, see Competing Class Actions and Litigation Committees,
SHAREHOLDER (IMF (Austl.) Ltd., Sydney, Austl.), Mar. 2009, at 1, available at http://www.imf.
com.au/pdf/TheShareholder_IMF0903.pdf; Vince Morabito, Clashing Classes Down Under—
Evaluating Australia’s Competing Class Actions Through Empirical and Comparative Perspec-
tives, 27 CONN. J. INT’L L. 245 (2012).
55. See Michael Legg, Reconciling Litigation Funding and the Opt Out Group Definition in
Federal Court of Australia Class Actions—The Need for a Legislative Common Fund Approach,
30 CIV. JUST. Q. 52, 61–62 (2011) (listing examples of multiple closed class actions).
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the desire of a defendant to gain a comprehensive release from litiga-
tion, even with those who are not obligated to compensate properly
the parties who assumed the risks of the litigation.56  Thus far, this
problem has arisen in the securities fraud context, where there may be
larger financial actors willing to assume some of the burdens of litiga-
tion.  This will not translate well to the mass consumer context in
which litigation funders are unlikely to be able to contract with
enough individual class members and in which class members cannot
bring their claims without funding.
Efforts to circumvent the funding problem by asking for a court
order to apportion costs among all beneficiaries of class efforts have
floundered thus far.57  In Modtech Engineering Pty Ltd. v GPT Man-
agement Holdings Ltd.,58 the settlement agreement stipulated that the
attorneys’ costs and funder’s commission would be deducted from the
entire damage award before individual awards were calculated, mean-
ing that all members, whether they signed contracts with the firm and
the funders or not, would have their awards reduced on a pro rata
basis.59  The Federal Court found that this was appropriate as to the
attorneys’ fees, as the legal costs were fixed, and “should be borne by
those who benefitted,”60 but inappropriate when applied to the
funder’s commission, as the funders had made a commercial decision
to fund the litigation and assume the risk of adverse costs despite the
fact that not all of the class members had signed their agreement, and
those individuals should not be forced into a contract to which they
did not agree.61  In effect, the strategy was a backdoor into a common-
fund regime, which remains an ongoing project among Australian
courts, attorneys, and academics.62
Additionally, the liberalization of the class definition could not rem-
edy the moral hazard problem associated with investing the privately
held legal claims.  Funders have to overcome a potential information
problem with regard to the claims of the individuals who have every
incentive to withhold adverse information prior to the funding com-
56. See, e.g., id. at 53; Hensler, supra note 53, at 1–2.
57. A similar strategy was first attempted by a class that was not funded by a third party,
where attorneys structured the settlement such that funding members received a much larger
award than nonfunding members.  However the Full Federal Court struck this settlement down
in part, ironically, because it was not funded by a third party, and therefore the funding award
was arbitrary and unfair, rather than being set by the market. Australian Sec. and Invs. Comm’n
v Richards [2013] FCAFC 89.
58. Modtech Eng’g Pty Ltd. v GPT Mgmt. Holdings Ltd. [2013] FCA 626.
59. Id. ¶ 22.
60. Id. ¶ 24.
61. Id. ¶¶ 55–57.
62. For more on potential implementations of this regime, see Legg, supra note 55 at 70–72.
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mitment.  This is a variant of the problem faced in the United States
by plaintiffs’ counsel when they have to decide whether to accept a
portfolio of claims offered by referring lawyers (such as the purveyors
of the late-night advertisements); there is simply no way of knowing
what is in the mix of cases or how much work has been done to screen
the cases effectively.
Despite the problems, funding is slowly creating a real class action
regime in Australia, overcoming the major barriers of cost liability of
the named plaintiff and lack of contingency fees.  To some extent the
funders are in a better position to assess cases than lawyers accepting
a referral in the United States.  First, because the funders will be fi-
nancing the litigation, including a large part of the costs of counsel,
there is more dependency on the part of the lawyers seeking funding
for a case to make suitable representations on the quality of the
claims.  Further, Australia has tighter initial pleading rules than the
United States, so a claim on file will have more information and more
of a developed fact record than would be necessary in the United
States.63
This informational protection against moral hazard works best for
certain kinds of legal claims.  Funders are reasonably suited to assess
the liability prospects at the front end of the litigation.  However, they
are poorly positioned to assess the bona fides of long-term occupa-
tional individual injuries (i.e., the damages side of the equation),
which is critical since the funders are recovering a percentage of the
quantum assessed as damages or recovered through settlement.64
Therefore, it would stand to reason that funders would gravitate to
areas of law where damages are assessable on an aggregate basis, and
where individual variations would simply be a determination of the
allocation of the gross award, rather than defining the recovery in
terms of calculating individual damages claims.  Thus, it is not surpris-
ing that the funders have concentrated initially on economic harm
cases (primarily securities cases) in which the harm is defined market
wide.  Only recently have funders entered the arena of mass physical
harm cases in Australia, such as the class action case arising from the
devastating flood in Queensland.65  Even here, the case is notable for
63. S. Stuart Clark & Christina Harris, Multi-Plaintiff Litigation in Australia: A Comparative
Perspective, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 289, 313 (2001).
64. See LEGG, supra note 46, at 28–29.
65. See Stephen Johnson & Petrina Berry, Qld Floods Class Action ‘Could Set Record,’ SYD-
NEY MORNING HERALD (Jan. 21, 2013), http://news.smh.com.au/breaking-news-national/qld-
floods-class-action-could-set-record-20130121-2d1xd.html. See generally C.E. HOLMES, QUEEN-
SLAND FLOODS COMM’N OF INQUIRY, FINAL REPORT (2012), available at http://floodcommission.
qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/11698/QFCI-Final-Report-March-2012.pdf.
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the devastation caused by a single event corresponding to a discrete
act of claimed negligence.
The market for litigation funding is relatively new and immature.
There are only five or six firms in Australia that are capitalized to
handle these investments, although there do appear to be some new
entrants exploring the market.66  As a result, the funders can afford to
be highly selective in the cases they take, which explains the high suc-
cess rate in financed cases to date.67  Perhaps because of the thin mar-
ket, funders appear to have the upper hand in negotiations with
traditional claimants’ firms.  Funders control their exposure by se-
quencing their payments to class counsel, rather than delivering their
financial commitment in block form at the threshold of litigation.  The
disbursements are sequenced as the litigation matures.68  Moreover,
litigation funders typically assume all the contingency risk in a case by
paying on a noncontingent basis.69  The funders pay attorneys’ hourly
fees as they accrue during the litigation, which further cements the
control the funders have over the case.
A curious by-product is that Australian claimant’s counsel relin-
quishes a great deal of entrepreneurial risk in the case.  The attorneys
of record are paid a substantial part of their fees by the funders,70 who
become the primary party at risk.  Because the funders are paying
hourly lawyer fees, they have incentives to limit costs and even to in-
ternalize the costs of the case.  This means that the claimants’ counsel
are in the position of having to report to the funders on the progress
of the case and on decisions of what steps to take next, if for no other
reason than to secure the next quantum of funding.  It seems ines-
capable that the funders would not in turn demand the right to partici-
pate in reviewing and approving litigation decisions.71  The simple and
well-recognized principle is that “he who pays the piper [picks] the
tune.”72  Funders try to limit their out-of-pocket costs by having in-
house attorneys of the funders do the legal work themselves,73 by try-
ing to discourage areas of legal work that they believe will be unfruit-
ful, and even by entering into settlement negotiations with the
66. HODGES ET AL., supra note 6, at 49; see also SIMON DLUZNIAK, IMF (AUSTRALIA) LTD,
LITIGATION FUNDING AND INSURANCE 2 (2009), available at http://www.imf.com.au/docs/de-
fault-source/site-documents/paper—-dluzniak.
67. Lin, supra note 33.
68. See Maya Steinitz, The Litigation Finance Contract, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 455, 467
(2012).
69. LEGG, supra note 46, at 4.
70. See HODGES ET AL, supra note 6, at 10.
71. LEGG, supra note 46, at 28–29.
72. Id. at 28.
73. HODGES ET AL., supra note 6, at 75–76.
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defendant themselves.  It does not take great imagination to see that
this brings them very close to being the real attorneys in the case in all
but name.74
The result is a curious re-creation of a divided bar.  The class law-
yers are those who go to court, much like barristers in the law courts,
although their ranks come from solicitors.  The funders then function
as the solicitors who mobilize the litigation and give instructions.  To
the extent that contingency fees are thought to better align the incen-
tives of counsel with their clients, the payment to counsel by the
funders diminishes the limited contingency incentives of class counsel,
as would be normal in the United States.  In its place, the financial
intermediary becomes the party at risk with complicated incentives to
limit litigation outlays while trying to achieve a favorable litigation
result.
III. LAWYER-DRIVEN CLASS ACTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
The Australian experience allows us to reexamine the role that law-
yers have come to play in American class actions.  As things stand,
lawyers effectively perform the critical functions of case organization
and management.  Lawyers are the gatekeepers who control case se-
lection.  They manage the interactions with clients and they assume
the responsibilities for financial underwriting of the litigation.  One
could imagine a system in which state regulators could decide the
threshold questions of whether private counsel should handle the
case, as is done with relator suits under qui tam statutes.  Similarly,
there could be intermediaries who act as the mobilizers of litigation,
as when a union can serve to direct the case.75  And most certainly
there are innumerable ways in which financial markets could assume
the role of financing entrepreneurial litigation, just as bankers have
provided the seed money for all manner of economic venture.  While
these are all roles that we have come to associate with lawyers, there
is no obvious reason why all the roles should be integrated.  Clearly,
funders represent a challenge to the traditional monopoly over one
aspect of the case in ways that may liberalize the market for capital
and rationalize the economics of class litigation.
But the question of the potential role of funders does not turn sim-
ply on the rules regulating the role of class counsel.  More significant
is the question of identifying the market niche that would provide an
74. See LEGG, supra note 46, at 28–32.
75. See, e.g., UAW v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274, 290 (1986) (“We therefore . . . hold that the UAW
has standing to litigate this action.”).
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inducement to participate and might, in turn, prompt reforms of class
action procedure to achieve some beneficial result.  At first glance, the
comparison to Australia does not seem propitious for litigation fi-
nance entry into this market.  Because the American rule already
forces each party to bear its own litigation costs, and because contin-
gency fee recovery is well established (particularly in the class action
setting), the immediate market advantages that funders had in Austra-
lia are not present.76  Key to the success of funders in Australia was
the regulation that prevented certain lawyers—those who could not
leverage their investments sufficiently to assume the indemnification
of class representatives or underwrite the high cost of mass litiga-
tion—from competing in the litigation finance market, at least thus
far.
That risk-return void is not present in U.S. class representation.
Lawyers are well accustomed to pricing contingency risk, and they
readily enter into representations of mind-numbing expense and com-
plexity.  Class representation may not be a game for the faint of heart
or light of wallet.  Nonetheless, the battles for control of mass cases in
front of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation77 or at class certi-
fication hearings indicates that there is a robust if concentrated bar
willing to assume the risks and potential rewards of large-stakes
litigation.
Presumably, however, funders could still enter the market for un-
derwriting the costs of class representation.  Key to such entry would
be the willingness to compete head-to-head with lawyers for the re-
turns on underwriting mass litigation.  Entry into this market would
be more difficult than in Australia, where the funders are shielded
from competition from the bar.  But this does not mean that there are
no potential points of entry in the United States.  Nor does it mean
that there is not tension in the American class action market that
could not be addressed by the infusion of new sources of litigation
capital, particularly as regards the high start-up costs of mass
litigation.
There are concerns that the “usual characters” tend to dominate
certain classes of aggregate litigation and that the established re-
sources of some major players help create an entrenched bar.  Under
76. See Janet C. Alexander, An Introduction to Class Action Procedure in the United States
10–11 (Jan. 1, 2000) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://law.duke.edu/grouplit/papers/
classactionalexander.pdf.
77. See generally Tammy B. Webb & Ina D. Chang, Drawing the Line Between Class Action
and Quasi-Class Action, A.B.A. SEC. LITIG. (Nov. 13, 2012), http://apps.americanbar.org/litiga-
tion/committees/masstorts/articles/fall2012-1112-drawing-the-line-class-action-quasi-class-action.
html.
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Rule 23(a)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, courts are in-
structed to ascertain the adequacy of representation afforded absent
class members.78  This requirement is most often associated with the
representation provided by class counsel, as opposed to the generally
passive named class representatives.  The judicial focus is on whether
class counsel are in some sense conflicted, thereby compromising the
“structural assurance[s] of fair[ness]”79 to all members of the putative
class, and whether class counsel have the experience and resources
necessary to wage battle against a usually better heeled defendant.  To
the extent that funders could expand the amount of capital available
for litigation, perhaps some of the barriers to entry would fall, and
with it some of the costs of representation.  Perhaps—or perhaps not.
It is simply not clear whether there is a market void as in Australia—
one crying out for economic rationalization.
The more difficult question is whether the presence of independent
funders may serve as a buffer on some of the agency costs associated
with complete lawyer control over the litigation.  I have spent a great
deal of time on the question of the legitimacy of governance in the
context of representational litigation, both in my academic writing80
and in my role in the American Law Institute’s project on aggregate
litigation.81  The major class action cases of the past fifteen years have
returned time and again to the problem of how to ensure the faithful-
ness of the class representatives to the interests of the passive class
members who lack the ability or incentive to monitor the litigation
activities of those who act on their behalf.  This theme unifies the dis-
parate technical questions presented in cases from Amchem82 and Or-
tiz83 over a decade ago, to Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes84 and Smith
v. Bayer85 more recently.86
If we consider the question of representational fidelity to the inter-
ests of the absent class members as a matter of agency cost endemic to
78. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4).
79. E.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 627 (1997) (“The settling parties, in
sum, achieved a global compromise with no structural assurance of fair and adequate representa-
tion for the diverse groups and individuals affected.”).
80. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999
SUP. CT. REV. 337; see also Samuel Issacharoff, The Governance Problem in Aggregate Litiga-
tion, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3165 (2013).
81. See AM. L. INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION (2010).
82. Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. 591.
83. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
84. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
85. Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368 (2011).
86. For further discussion of the ability to bind the absent class to the litigation decisions of a
class action, see Samuel Issacharoff, Assembling Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 699 (2013).
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all principal-agent relations, the question becomes: What strategies
are available to reduce the potential for agency cost?  Over the past
twenty years, there have been three efforts to police the agency cost in
litigation, each with mixed results, but each addressing the same prob-
lem of active lawyers and passive class members.
The first approach was to find a class member to empower with
oversight functions.  The 1983 Third Circuit Task Force report on at-
torneys’ fees, reported by my colleague Arthur Miller, proposed to
empower some class member(s) to negotiate the fees of class repre-
sentation at the start of the litigation and to assume some supervisory
authority through the progression of the case.87  That proposal foun-
dered on the fact that in most small-value class actions, no class mem-
ber cares whether class counsel gets $2 or $3 from a $10 recovery on a
$20 claim, and no class member will invest any time to monitor the
work of class counsel given the limited stake.88  The centrality of the
negative value justification for small stakes class actions compromised
any effort to elevate any individual or individuals from the class into
the role of agents watching agents—a theme to which I will shortly
turn.
A variant on the Third Circuit effort came with the 1995 Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA).89  Instead of selecting a
class representative because of her typicality, the PSLRA sought to
harness the self-interest of a single class member precisely because of
atypicality.  The PSLRA substituted the lead plaintiff (defined gener-
ally as the investor with the greatest stake in the contested securities
transactions—usually a retirement fund or some other institutional
player) as the intermediary between the class and class counsel.90  The
basic idea was that the self-interest of the player with the largest stake
would provide the incentives to oversee the work of class counsel.91
The rest of the class could then free ride on the work of the lead
plaintiff.
The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA) tried to create an
alternative intermediary.92  Instead of choosing a party distinctly at
87. Court Awarded Attorney Fees, Report of the Third Circuit Task Force, 108 F.R.D. 237
(1985).
88. Id. at 255.
89. Private Securities Litigation Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
90. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(bb) (2012).
91. Third Circuit Task Force Report on Selection of Counsel, 74 TEMP. L. REV. 689, 752–53
(2001).
92. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
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risk, as with the lead plaintiff under the PSLRA, CAFA sought to
harness the structural independence of state attorneys general as in-
termediaries.93  If the PSLRA model turned on harnessed self-inter-
est, CAFA invited a preexisting commitment to the public interest to
serve as a check on agent misbehavior.  Under CAFA, any class action
settlement brought into federal court because of its nationwide mar-
ket impact has to be accompanied with notice to all the attorneys gen-
eral of the state of residence of any class member.94  The hope was
that having public officials review the actions taken on behalf of their
constituents would prompt vigilant oversight, and deter misconduct
for fear of that oversight.
Finally, there are efforts to increase the vigilance of courts beyond
their role as normally passive recipients of party arguments under the
adversarial system.  Despite the formal requirements of judicial inde-
pendence from the interests of any one party, there have been efforts
to reconceptualize the role of the judge as serving as a fiduciary for
the class that comes into being as a result of judicial dictate.95  In part,
this impulse to compel greater judicial oversight of the interests of
absent class members motivated the 2003 reforms of Rule 23 in re-
quiring greater formal attention to the selection and compensation of
class counsel.96
Each of these strategies seeks to dampen the perceived concentra-
tion of power in the hands of class counsel.  Each is an attempt to
reduce perceived agency cost through the introduction of incentivized
intermediaries.  The strategy is one of interposing intermediary agents
to watch over the primary agents, a strategy that Dan Ortiz and I re-
ferred to as “governing through intermediaries.”97  The basic intuition
is that the same lack of ability that leads people to seek out agents
(ranging the gamut from auto mechanics to dentists to lawyers, and so
forth) also limits the ability to monitor and assess the performance of
93. 28 U.S.C. § 1715(a) (2012).
94. Id. § 1715(b); see also Steven M. Puiszis, Developing Trends with the Class Action Fairness
Act of 2005, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 115, 117 (2006).
95. See Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 279–80 (7th Cir. 2002) (“We and
other courts have gone so far as to term the district judge in the settlement phase of a class
action suit a fiduciary of the class, who is subject therefore to the high duty of care that the law
requires of fiduciaries.”); see also Chris Brummer, Note, Sharpening the Sword: Class Certifica-
tion, Appellate Review, and the Role of the Fiduciary Judge in Class Action Lawsuits, 104 COLUM.
L. REV. 1042 (2004).
96. See Peter J. Beshar & Megan A. Jones, The New Class Action Rules, N.Y. L.J. (Dec. 4,
2003), available at http://www.gibsondunn.com/fstore/documents/pubs/NYLJ_Class_Action_
Rules.pdf.
97. Samuel Issacharoff & Daniel R. Ortiz, Governing Through Intermediaries, 85 VA. L. REV.
1627 (1999).
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those agents.  The natural response is to look for heuristics or other
intermediaries to help solve the problem of monitoring agents.  For
example, we have tremendous difficulties in monitoring the perform-
ance of our elected representatives.  The sheer volume of legislation
and proposed legislation, together with the technical details of line
item revisions and complexity, all make it impossible to really assess
how well our representatives are doing their jobs and satisfying our
wishes.98  In turn, we rely on a species of “superagents”99 to monitor
the performance of our agents and inform our next series of electoral
choices.  In the electoral arena, these intermediary entrepreneurs may
be political parties, newspaper editorial endorsements, and similar
easy-cuing devices that allow us to navigate the decisional byways that
afflict our lives.
As I like to remind my first-year students, however, one of the few
veritable truths of life is that every gatekeeper in life will at some
point become a toll collector.  Each of the identified agents imposes
its own set of potential agency costs, unique to its particular concerns.
In the case of the PSLRA, for example, the creation of an intermedi-
ary power to select counsel quickly gave rise to charges of pay-to-play
with large public employee pension funds allegedly having the power
to extract campaign contributions or other forms of contributions.100
In any event, large institutional investors are unlikely to take the lead
role unless they have a sufficient stake and are concerned about the
formula for distributing the litigation proceeds.101
In similar fashion, the CAFA invitation for oversight by attorneys
general has rarely been accepted, largely because public officials con-
front scarce resources and have little political incentive to run around
the country monitoring low-value class settlements of marginal con-
cern to their constituents.102  Even more problematic is the inherent
tension between the duties of a class representative to protect zeal-
ously the interests of absent class members and the broader constitu-
98. See Press Release, Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, New Laws Ring in the New
Year (Dec. 27, 2011), available at http://www.ncsl.org/press-room/new-laws-ring-in-the-new-year.
aspx.
99. This is the term that Dan Ortiz and I applied to this problem of agents watching agents
(presumably in turn watching further agents).  Issacharoff & Ortiz, supra note 97, at 1631.
100. See, e.g., Karen Donovan, Legal Reform Turns a Steward Into an Activist, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 16, 2005, at C1; Kenneth Lovett, Pension Pay-to-Play: Law Firms Gave Controllers Big
Bucks, Then Got $518M in Fees from State Fund, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 8, 2009, at 10.
101. See Written Statement of Keith Johnson, Chief Legal Counsel, State of Wis. Inv. Bd., to
the Third Circuit Task Force on Selection of Class Counsel 2–3 (May 5, 2001), available at http://
www.ca3.uscourts.gov/sites/ca3/files/keithjohnson.pdf.
102. See Catherine M. Sharkey, CAFA Settlement Notice Provision: Optimal Regulatory Pol-
icy?, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1971, 1974–75 (2008).
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ent concerns of public officials.  The gap between the two creates a
new domain for agency costs, including the political objectives of at-
torneys general that may be at significant remove from those of the
class.103  The clearest example comes with attorneys general whose
primary intervention in proposed class action settlements is to de-
mand that a portion of the class recovery escheat to the state.104
Finally, for reasons rehearsed in prior scholarship, judges are poorly
positioned to serve as effective fiduciaries.  Most notably judges are
unlikely to have the case knowledge to assess the wisdom of litigation
and settlement decisions independent of the representations made to
them by the parties.105  Most class actions settle106—as do most cases
overall—and the settlement approval process generally features for-
mer adversaries who are now friends of the deal, and an increasing
array of unsavory strategic objectors who want only to raise pro forma
concerns in hope of getting paid to go away.
Enter the funders?  In the Australian context, funders filled a niche
that prevented efficient use of class actions.  If a central weakness in
American class actions is the lack of effective mechanisms to check
the perceived high risk of agency cost,—or at least, if the caselaw
yields the impression that this is a persistent problem in American
class action litigation—the question is whether third-party litigation
funding might fill the gap.  At least conceptually, third-party funders
could provide elements of the three mechanisms already in place
under the PSLRA, CAFA and Rule 23.  Like the lead plaintiff under
the PSLRA, a third-party funder with “skin in the game” has an in-
centive to monitor the performance of the lawyer-agents, but unlike
either the attorneys general or the courts, the funders should have
access to information throughout the prosecution of the case, not just
at the end.  Further, unlike even a well-positioned lead plaintiff under
the PSLRA, the return to the funder is presumably a percentage of
the class counsel’s fees, which are in turn dependent on the overall
size of the recovery.  The direct tie to the overall performance of the
case may yield better incentives and actually narrow the agency gap
between the class and its agents.  This is a proposition well advanced
by Elizabeth Burch:
103. Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: Representative Suits by State At-
torneys General, 126 HARV. L. REV. 486, 530 (2012).
104. Id. at 513–17.
105. See Lisa L. Casey, Reforming Securities Class Actions from the Bench: Judging Fiducia-
ries and Fiduciary Judging, 2003 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1239, 1282.
106. Charles B. Casper, The Class Action Fairness Act’s Impact on Settlements, ANTITRUST,
Fall 2005, at 26, 26.
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Allowing third parties, like commercial-claims lenders, to invest in
the litigation’s outcome by contracting directly with plaintiffs gener-
ates two positive effects.  First, it disentangles—at least in part—the
lawyer’s role as investor from her role as a fiduciary and advisor.
When litigating no longer threatens the law firm’s solvency or abil-
ity to take on other matters, the attorney’s loyalty no longer divides
between self-preservation and her clients: She can afford to be a
faithful representative.  Second, assigning a financier a percentage
of the plaintiffs’ winnings converts that financier into a sizeable
stakeholder and incentivizes it to monitor the attorneys and the liti-
gation’s costs.107
Let me conclude this Article by opening a discussion that has not
yet, at least to my knowledge, emerged in the literature.  The question
may seem shocking, but it follows from the proposition that a signifi-
cant issue in class action practice is one of agency cost.  What follows
is quite simple: Should courts require class counsel to secure some
measure of third-party funding?  This may not be a realistic issue at
present because the litigation funding industry in the United States is
too small to accommodate the immediate demand that would be cre-
ated,108 yielding a bonanza for funders and an unwarranted tax on
legitimate class counsel.
But in the spirit of the exercise, I suggest that courts, which are
uncertain about the propriety of a proposed class action, or are con-
cerned about the headless class problem, could seek to bring in
funders as a way to get an incentivized monitor on the return to the
class.109  By and large, courts are likely to be shocked or even horri-
fied by the presence of funding entities acting behind courtroom law-
107. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Financiers as Monitors in Aggregate Litigation, 87 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1273, 1316 (2012).  Although Burch discusses alternative financing arrangements between
class counsel and third-party funders, I address exclusively making the funders a contingent ben-
eficiary of the size of the recovery.  I do so because the focus is not only on expanding the source
of capital to overcome cash-flow problems for the plaintiffs’ firm, but also to incentivize a maxi-
mum of monitoring.
108. See Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway? Third-Party Litigation Funding, 95
MINN. L. REV. 1268, 1271 (2011) (“Litigation finance in the United States is in its infancy, how-
ever.”).  Litigation funding is not done as much in the United States. HODGES ET AL., supra note
6, at 38.  But the number of firms coming to the United States is growing.  Vanessa O’Connell,
Funds Spring Up to Invest in High-Stakes Litigation, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2011, at B1.
109. This proposal is not entirely without precedent.  In the early stages of experimenting with
auctions for the selection of counsel in class action cases, Judge Vaughn Walker required proof of
either malpractice insurance or bonding as a condition for being a participant in the auction
process.  That requirement appears to have been intended to weed out weak bidders without
resources who could only accept lowball offers to settle.  The aim here is to push further in the
direction of incentivizing a co-venturer who would need to monitor class counsel performance.
Cf. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and
Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV.
1, 105–16 (1991).
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yers and introducing the prospect of unaccountable decision making
in litigated disputes.  But perhaps if litigation funding were brought
into the open and harnessed to address the perceived current difficul-
ties in class representation, the fear of the unknown might yield to the
introduction of a new market mechanism to manage representative
litigation.
There are numerous parallels in which regulators seek to compel
third-party participation as a way of bringing in an intermediary with
the incentive to monitor conduct that official bodies have trouble pa-
trolling.  Think about bail bondsmen who, at least in the movies, rou-
tinely hire Robert DeNiro or Katherine Heigl to enforce the limits of
time out of jail.  Or think of the innumerable bonding and insurance
requirements for mining and construction and other highly regulated
activities.110  Some part of those requirements are guarantees of sol-
vency in case of harms that require compensating victims, particularly
to guarantee the security of outsiders to the undertaking who have no
contractual mechanism to protect themselves.  But a major part of the
outside bonding and insurance requirement is to create an incen-
tivized monitor of the underlying activity deemed likely to produce
costly misconduct.
To give one recent example, consider the proposed regulatory re-
sponses to the Deepwater Horizon disaster in the Gulf of Mexico.
There are of course a series of prohibitions that will follow, and a
series of specific technical requirements that in retrospect would have
prevented the missteps giving rise to the spill.  Undoubtedly these are
important responses, and undoubtedly as well they will have some ele-
ment of Clauswitz’s general dutifully preparing to fight the last war.
But one of the interesting proposals of the National Commission of
the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling was to in-
crease the insurance requirements for offshore activity.111  To date,
there has been no solvency issue in the ability of British Petroleum,
Halliburton, Transocean, and the major actors to cover the costs, pen-
alties and fines of the damage in the Gulf.   Rather, the purpose is to
introduce another incentivized monitor into what will always be risky
activity.
110. See generally Mary Ellen West, 25A SUMMARY PA. JUR. 2D Environmental Law § 11:66
(2013).
111. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE DRILLING,
DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING 285 (2011),
available at http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/DEEPWATER_
ReReporttothePreside_FINAL.pdf.
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On this view, third-party litigation funding may reduce the agency
risk in representative litigation not so much by opening the pool of
capital available for the prosecution of class claims, but by introducing
a genuinely motivated monitor of class counsel performance with in-
terests that align, albeit imperfectly, with those of the represented
class.  The approach clearly differs from the PSLRA, CAFA, or the
2003 amendments to Rule 23 in inviting a market actor to serve as an
intermediary agent.  But we are already well down the path of en-
trepreneurial litigation and the emergence of a new set of institutional
actors opens up a new prospect for revisiting one of the central issues
in class action litigation.
IV. CONCLUSION
So far the debates over third-party funders have turned mostly on
whether the practice should be allowed in the United States.  Some
argue that it is just another source of excess litigation.112  Others may
worry about the further erosion of standards of professionalism.113
Without wanting to jump the shark, I think it is time to advance the
discussion to see what might be the potential market benefits of new
forms of litigation finance.  It is never too soon to start thinking about
the future.
112. See, e.g., JOHN BEISNER ET AL., U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, SELLING
LAWSUITS, BUYING TROUBLE: THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING IN THE UNITED STATES 5
(2009).
113. See, e.g., id. at 8; Weber, supra note 34.
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